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181 
Over My Dead Body: The Legal Nightmare and 
Medical Phenomenon of Posthumous Conception 
Through Postmortem Sperm Retrieval 
“[T]here is no voice advocating the complete dismissal of the wishes 
of the dead . . . .  [T]he importance of the decision to reproduce is of such 
moment and has such a deeply personal nature that procreative autonomy 
survives death.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
All great medical phenomena begin as a rarity, taking years to in-
crease in numbers and success stories—if in fact they ever do.  These med-
ical marvels initially shock the mind of an average citizen if he or she is 
even aware the marvel exists and is medically possible.  Such is the case 
with postmortem sperm retrieval (PMSR).  PMSR involves extracting 
sperm—or gametic material—from a recently deceased male for the pur-
pose of impregnating a woman, presumably his surviving wife, and con-
ceiving a child with her after his death.2  Most often, the extracted sperm is 
frozen for future use.3 
PMSR, however, is not a new concept; its origin dates back to 1980.4  
Nor is it strictly confined to the United States.5  Although PMSR is a 
 
 1. Katheryn D. Katz, Parenthood From the Grave: Protocols for Retrieving and Uti-
lizing Gametes From the Dead or Dying, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 289, 300–01 (2006) (citing 
Belinda Bennett, Posthumous Reproduction and the Meaning of Autonomy, 23 MELB. U. L. 
REV. 286, 286 (1999)). 
 2. Mary F. Radford, Postmortem Sperm Retrieval and the Social Security Administra-
tion: How Modern Reproductive Technology Makes Strange Bedfellows, 2 EST. PLAN. & 
COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 33, 35–36 (2009) (describing the techniques used to accomplish 
PMSR); see also Katz, supra note 1, at 308 (discussing the same phenomenon but using the 
term “postmortem gamete retrieval” instead of PMSR). 
 3. See Radford, supra note 2, at 36; Philip Cohen & Michael Day, Never Say Die, 
NEW SCIENTIST, Mar. 24, 1999, at 2179, 2179 (reporting on the first PMSR procedure to re-
sult in a live birth); Bryce Weber, Ron Kodama, & Keith Jarvi, Postmortem Sperm Retriev-
al: The Canadian Perspective, 30 J. ANDROLOGY 407, 407 (2009), available at 
http://www.andrologyjournal.org/cgi/reprint/30/4/407.pdf. 
 4. See Carson Strong, Consent to Sperm Retrieval and Insemination After Death or 
Persistent Vegetative State, 14 J.L. & HEALTH 243, 244 (2000) (citing Cappy Miles Roth-
man, A Method for Obtaining Viable Sperm in the Postmortem State, 34 FERTILITY AND 
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worldwide, death-defying occurrence, it lacks a legal backbone.6  For this 
reason, hospitals have been forced to draft their own rules regarding the 
procedure.7  While the medical community has done well with promulgat-
ing guidelines for facing this unusual occurrence on its own, this Comment 
suggests the need for legislation on the topic in order to protect all parties 
involved.8  Furthermore, legislation is needed to resolve what happens to a 
child conceived and born from postmortem sperm retrieval as it relates to 
probate, class gifts, social security, and legal status in general.9 
Part I of this Comment lays a historical foundation of the gradual de-
velopment of case law dealing with reproductive rights as they relate to 
postmortem conception and discusses uniform laws that have partially ad-
dressed the issue of PMSR.  Part II explains more specifically the difficul-
ties facing the legal community due to the lack of precedent on the topic 
and lack of legislation; it also delves into the problems of construing post-
mortem intent and how that uncertainty affects PMSR from the outset. 
The first three subparts of Part III discuss the public policy arguments 
against PMSR, while the fourth subpart takes a look into how society views 
it.  The final two subparts of Part III present arguments for why PMSR 
should not be banned and suggest the implementation of a “Statute of For-
malities” to address the problems surrounding PMSR. 
 
STERILITY 512 (1980)) (discussing the first case of extracting sperm from a man’s body fol-
lowing death in 1980.). 
 5. Since 1980, numerous requests for PMSR have been made throughout the world.  
See generally R. Landau, Posthumous Sperm Retrieval for the Purpose of Later Insemina-
tion or IVF in Israel: An Ethical and Psychosocial Critique, 19 HUM. REPROD. 1952 (2004), 
available at http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org/content/19/9/1952.full.pdf+html (discussing 
PMSR in Israel); Weber et al., supra note 3 (discussing PMSR in Canada); J. Dostal et al., 
Post-Mortem Sperm Retrieval in New European Union Countries: Case Report, 20 HUM. 
REPROD. 2359 (2005), available at  http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org/content/20/8/ 
2359.full.pdf#page=1&view=FitH (discussing PMSR in Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia); Rebecca Collins, Post-
humous Reproduction and the Presumption Against Consent in Cases of Death Caused by 
Sudden Trauma, 30 J. MED. & PHIL. 431 (2005), available at 
http://jmp.oxfordjournals.org/content/30/4/431. full.pdf#page=1&view=FitH (discussing 
posthumous reproduction in Australia and New Zealand). 
 6. See infra Part.II.A–C. 
 7. See, e.g., New York Hospital Guidelines for Consideration of Requests for Postmor-
tem Sperm Retrieval, CORNELLUROLOGY.COM, http://www.cornellurology.com/ 
guidelines.shtml (last visited Nov. 6, 2011) [hereinafter New York Hospital Guidelines]. 
 8. See Katz, supra note 1, at 315–16 (raising in her conclusion the question of whether 
legislative intervention is needed or whether PMSR procedures should remain solely a ques-
tion of medical ethics). 
 9. See id. at 316 (suggesting briefly in her conclusion that legislation is needed to 
“clarify the status of children born as the result of [PMSR]”); infra Part II.A–C. 
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II. THE GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT OF POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION LAW 
To say the law surrounding postmortem conception—and more specif-
ically, PMSR—is limited would be an understatement.  Over the past twen-
ty years, case law on artificial reproduction has developed slowly,10 leaving 
many questions surrounding the topic unexamined and unanswered.  Par-
ticularly within the area of PMSR, the only regulations—and this term is 
used loosely—directly on point are developed by hospitals as guidelines for 
granting or denying requests for PMSR.11  Only a few states have ad-
dressed the legal problems of postmortem conception,12 and even fewer 
have specifically addressed the controversial issue of PMSR.13  
A.  The Seminal Case for Posthumous Conception: Hecht v. Superior 
Court 
On October 30, 1991, William E. Kane committed suicide, leaving 
behind the most bizarre devise for his live-in girlfriend, Deborah E. Hecht: 
fifteen vials of his sperm.14  Kane made a deposit at a sperm bank in Octo-
ber of 1991.15  Prior to depositing his specimens at the sperm bank, Kane 
signed an “Authorization to Release Specimens” form, which specifically 
provided for the sperm bank to release his vials to Hecht or Hecht’s physi-
cian.16  In addition to the release form, Kane also executed a will on Sep-
tember 27, 1991, in which he stated all of his stored specimens were to go 
 
 10. Artificial reproduction is a broad topic encompassing, among other procedures, 
postmortem sperm retrieval, artificial insemination, and cryogenically preserving sperm and 
eggs.  Although the law on artificial reproduction as a general field has progressed, the legal 
community has largely failed to address the problems created by more narrow subsets of 
artificial reproduction, such as PMSR.  It is for this reason that this Comment suggests the 
need for legislation. 
 11. See, e.g., New York Hospital Guidelines, supra note 7. 
 12. The states that have addressed postmortem conception have addressed it through 
uniform laws such as the Uniform Probate Code, the Uniform Parentage Act, and the Uni-
form Anatomical Gift Act. 
 13. See infra Part II.A–C. 
 14. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
 15. Id.  Although Kane’s making a deposit at a sperm bank and killing himself all in the 
same month raises suspicions about his true intent or state of mind, it does not seem to fac-
tor into the court’s analysis.  Maybe the proximity of the two acts could further solidify 
Kane’s true intent to conceive a child posthumously with Hecht.  In a footnote, however, the 
court references a suit filed by Kane’s children against Hecht for wrongful death and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, alleging, among other things, that Hecht had unduly 
influenced Kane into bequeathing his sperm and property to her.  Id. at 279 n.2. 
 16. Id. 
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to Hecht.17  Kane’s will provided that it was Kane’s intention and wish for 
Hecht to become “impregnated with [his] sperm, before or after [his] 
death,” and the will thereafter referenced “our future child or children.”18  
Kane had also written a letter to his future, not yet conceived, children, 
where he again specifically stated his intention for Hecht to conceive a 
child from his sperm after his death.19 
Kane’s two children from a previous marriage contested the will, ar-
guing that (1) a posthumously born child would disrupt their existing fami-
ly balance, (2) the posthumously born child would be harmed because he or 
she would not be raised in a traditional family home, and (3) it would vio-
late public policy for Hecht to become impregnated by Kane’s sperm be-
cause Kane and Hecht were never married.20  On these three grounds, 
Kane’s children sought to have the sperm destroyed.21 
The trial court in Hecht relied on Moore v. Regents of University of 
California in finding that Kane did not have a possessory interest in his 
sperm once it left his body.22  Beginning its analysis with California pro-
bate laws, the California Court of Appeals rejected the trial court’s decision 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 276–77. 
 19. Id. at 277.  Portions of the letter read as follows: 
I address this to my children, because, although I have only two . . . it may be that 
Deborah will decide—as I hope she will—to have a child by me after my death.  
I’ve been assiduously generating frozen sperm samples for that eventuality.  If she 
does, then this letter is for my posthumous offspring, as well, with the thought that 
I have loved you in my dreams, even though I never got to see you born . . . I 
wanted to leave you with something more than a dead enigma that was your fa-
ther. 
Id. 
 20. Id. at 279, 284. 
 21. Id. at 279.  Interestingly, courts have found testamentary orders for the destruction 
of property to be against public policy.  See, e.g., Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 
S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (holding it was against public policy to destroy the dece-
dent’s house, despite decedent’s express language in her will to do so, because it would 
harm neighbors and adjacent land value).  California, however, had not ruled that sperm or 
bodily fluid was property; in fact, it had done just the opposite.  Moore v. Regents of Univ. 
of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that he had a property owner-
ship right in his bodily fluids and should be entitled to a conversion cause of action against 
the hospital for using his bodily fluids without paying him or obtaining his informed con-
sent.).  Perhaps this explains why the lower court in Hecht accepted the children’s argument 
that the sperm should be destroyed. 
 22. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 136–37; Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 281 (discussing both the 
trial court’s decision and Moore). 
4
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and its reliance on Moore.23  The court distinguished Moore from the issue 
in Hecht by stating that the court in Moore had not fully resolved the de-
bate over what, if any, property interest an individual has over his or her 
body.24  The court in Hecht concluded that Kane had both an ownership in-
terest in his sperm and the “decision making authority” over how it was to 
be used for reproduction.25  By making this determination, the court held 
that Kane’s sperm was property within the meaning of the probate code, 
and therefore, the court had jurisdiction over the vials of sperm.26 
The Hecht court ultimately concluded that (1) it was not against public 
policy for Hecht, as an unmarried woman, to be inseminated with Kane’s 
sperm, and (2) postmortem conception was not against public policy.27  The 
court refused to consider whether a child brought into the world without 
ever knowing his father would be adversely affected or whether a posthu-
mously born child would disrupt the family dynamic and be a burden on 
society.28  These public policy arguments have been the subject of an end-
less debate on PMSR.29 
 
 23. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 280–81.  The Hecht court stated that it was “self-
defeating for [the] parties to argue, under the rationale of Moore, that decedent had no own-
ership or possessory interest in his sperm once it left his body, because the sperm then 
would not constitute part of Kane’s estate and the probate court would not have jurisdiction 
over its disposition.”  Id. 
 24. Id. at 281. 
 25. Id. at 283 (discussing Kane’s interest in his sperm at the time of his death). The 
court found that, because Kane’s intention was to have his frozen sperm impregnate Hecht, 
the stored sperm was “unlike other human tissue because it [was] ‘gametic material’ that 
[could] be used for reproduction.”  Id. at 283 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 
(Tenn. 1992).  The court also stated “the value of sperm lies in its potential to create a 
child.”  Id.; see also infra Part.III.E. 
 26. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283. 
 27. Id. at 287, 290–91.  After the court handed down its decisions, the case went back to 
the probate court.  Kane v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 578, 580 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).  
The probate court decided to distribute the sperm in the same percentage as the estate had 
been settled, with Hecht receiving 20% and the children each receiving 40%.  Id.  Hecht 
tried to conceive a child using the sperm, but was never able to conceive, partly due to the 
decreased quantity of sperm.  See Andrea Corvalan, Comment, Fatherhood After Death: A 
Legal and Ethical Analysis of Posthumous Reproduction, 7 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 335, 350 
(1997). 
 28. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 291 (quoting Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 787 (Cal. 
1993)) (“[I]t is not the role of the judiciary to inhibit the use of reproductive technology 
when the Legislature has not seen fit to do so; any such effort would raise serious questions 
in light of the fundamental nature of the rights of procreation and privacy.”) 
 29. See infra Part IV.A–C. 
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B.  Case Law After Hecht 
There have been several cases addressing Hecht and the sperm-
property theory it espoused.  Before addressing the cases that have come 
after Hecht, it is important to be familiar with the holding in Davis v. Da-
vis.30  Davis involved a dispute between a recently divorced husband and 
wife over the ownership of their cryopreserved pre-embryos.31  The ex-wife 
wanted to use the pre-embryos to conceive a child, while the husband was 
“vehemently opposed to fathering a child that would not live with both par-
ents.”32  The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that when there is a dispute 
over the disposition of pre-embryos, the party opposing procreation should 
prevail and should not be forced to be a parent against his or her will.33  
This holding is in conformity with the argument that PMSR should not oc-
cur when the man did not explicitly agree to his sperm being extracted from 
his body for the purpose of conceiving a child long after his death.34 
Other cases are worth noting briefly for their holdings.  In Woodward 
v. Commissioner of Social Security,35 Lauren Woodward applied for social 
security benefits for herself and her twin daughters.36  Woodward’s twin 
daughters were conceived with her husband’s cryopreserved sperm, and 
born almost exactly two years after Mr. Woodward had passed away.37  
The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied Mrs. Woodward’s claim, 
and she appealed.38  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that 
the posthumously conceived twins could inherit from their deceased genet-
ic father if Mrs. Woodward could prove the following: (1) the genetic rela-
tionship between Mr. Woodward and the twins, (2) that Mr. Woodward had 
consented before his death to Mrs. Woodward using his stored sperm to re-
produce posthumously, and (3) that Mr. Woodward had consented before 
 
 30. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).  The Hecht court relied on Davis in 
holding that sperm occupies the same “interim” property position that embryos occupy due 
to the potential for life.  Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283. 
 31. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589.  The court used the term “pre-embryo” to refer to the 
stage of development within fourteen days of egg fertilization.  Id. at 593. 
 32. Id. at 604. 
 33. Id.  The court also stated that this would be the rule when the party in favor of pro-
creation has other means of reproducing or simply wishes to donate the pre-embryos to 
someone else.  Id.  When there are no viable alternatives for one of the parties to reproduce, 
the argument in favor of procreation using the pre-embryos would have more weight.  Id. 
 34. See infra Parts III.A, IV.C. 
 35. Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002). 
 36. Id. at 260. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  The SSA denied Mrs. Woodward’s claim due to her failure to prove the twins 
were Mr. Woodward’s “children” under the terms of the intestacy statute.  Id. 
6
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his death to support any posthumously born children.39  The court, howev-
er, suggested that even if these conditions were satisfied, a time limit might 
preclude qualifying for inheritance rights.40 
An interesting case dealing directly with PMSR involved a posthu-
mously conceived child born nearly four years after her father’s death.41  In 
Vernoff v. Astrue, the court basically adopted a test analogous to the one 
adopted in Woodward.42  In order for Brandalynn to inherit under state law 
and receive Social Security benefits, Mrs. Vernoff had to establish that 
Brandalynn was the natural child of Mr. Vernoff, as defined by the statute, 
or a dependent of Mr. Vernoff when he died.43 
First, because Brandalynn was not even conceived when Mr. Vernoff 
died, much less born, she could not establish herself as being actually de-
pendent upon Mr. Vernoff at his death.44  Second, because there was no ev-
idence of Mr. Vernoff’s intent to father and support a posthumously born 
child, Brandalynn could not establish that Mr. Vernoff was her “parent” 
under California law.45  Third, Brandalynn could not establish her right to 
 
 39. Id. at 269.  The court required the deceased’s pre-mortem consent to posthumous 
reproduction to be “clear[] and unequivocal[],” stating that silence or “equivocal indications 
of a desire to parent posthumously, ‘ought not to be construed as consent.’”  Id. (quoting 
Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous Procreation, 75 
N.C. L. Rev. 901, 951 (1997)). 
 40. Id. at 272. 
 41. Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009).  This case involves Bran-
dalynn Vernoff, arguably the first person born through the use of PMSR.  See Radford, su-
pra note 2, at 34–35; Cohen & Day, supra note 3. But see Baby from Dead Husband’s 
Sperm, BBC NEWS ONLINE (Mar. 27, 1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/ na-
ture/305302.stm (discussing the Vernoff baby as the first PMSR birth in the U.S., but stating 
that a woman in France holds the record as having the first PMSR birth two years prior). 
 42. See Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1107–08. 
 43. Id. at 1106–10.  The court laid out three methods of establishing dependency, which 
would entitle Brandalynn to Social Security benefits.  Id. at 1106–07  The three methods 
were: “(1) show[ing] actual dependency at the time of the insured's death;     (2) . . . estab-
lishing that the insured is her ‘parent’ under California law provisions . . . ; or (3) . . . estab-
lishing that she may inherit from the insured under the intestacy laws of California.”  Id.  
Under the second and third tests, Mrs. Vernoff had to establish, as in Woodward, that Mr. 
Vernoff had both consented to father a posthumously conceived child and to support the 
child posthumously.  Id. at 1107. 
 44. Id. at 1106–07. 
 45. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1109–10 (stating that the “basis for establishing natural 
parenthood” was “the decedent’s consent to the posthumous conception”).  The court drew 
heavily from Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004), which held that the 
“natural child” requirement had been established when the mother was married to the de-
ceased father, the posthumously conceived child was the biological child of the deceased 
father, and the deceased father had expressly consented to his sperm being used postmortem 
for the purpose of conceiving. 
7
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inherit from Mr. Vernoff under California intestacy law.46  Not only was 
there no evidence of Mr. Vernoff’s written consent to father a child post-
humously, Brandalynn was born nearly four years after her father’s death, 
which precluded her from meeting the two-year time restriction.47  There-
fore, the Ninth Circuit held that Brandalynn could not inherit from her fa-
ther’s estate and could not qualify for Social Security benefits.48 
These cases all lead to the same conclusion: the deceased’s consent 
regarding PMSR and posthumous conception are essential to determining 
the child’s legal status under intestacy and probate laws. 
C.  The Uniform Probate Code on Posthumous Conception 
There are still many questions surrounding the rights of children born 
posthumously that Hecht, Davis, Woodward, and Vernoff fail to answer.  
Furthermore, there are many states that have not been presented with the 
issues that the Massachusetts and California courts have been forced to an-
swer.  Another question is whether the two-year time limit in the California 
probate law is reasonable, or if more time should be added to provide for a 
posthumously conceived child if the father’s written consent provides for 
it.49 
The Uniform Probate Code (the Code) has created several presump-
tions that affect the parentage and rights of posthumously born children.  
Section 2-120 of the Uniform Probate Code outlines how a legal parent–
child relationship can be established in situations where the child is born 
through assisted reproduction.50  Section 2-120(f) provides: 
[A] parent-child relationship exists between a child of assisted reproduction 
and an individual other than the birth mother who consented to assisted re-
production by the birth mother with intent to be treated as the other parent 
of the child. Consent to assisted reproduction by the birth mother with in-
 
 46. Id. at 1110.  In order to inherit under California intestacy law, Brandalynn had to 
prove 
by clear and convincing evidence that . . . the decedent, in writing, specifie[d] that 
his or her genetic material shall be used for the posthumous conception of a child 
of the decedent . . . [and] the child was in utero using the decedent’s genetic mate-
rial . . . within two years of the date of . . . decedent’s death. 
CAL. PROBATE CODE § 249.5 (West 2009). 
 47. Id. at 1111–12. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Radford, supra note 2, at 60–61 (suggesting it is in the government’s interest to 
construe the Social Security Act “somewhat more narrowly” to limit some posthumously 
born children’s rights to benefits based on the number of years between the father’s death 
and the child’s birth). 
 50. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120 (amended 2008). 
8
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tent to be treated as the other parent of the child is established if the indi-
vidual . . . signed a record that . . . evidences the individual’s consent; 
or . . . intended to be treated as a parent of a posthumously conceived child, 
if that intent is established by clear and convincing evidence.51 
In addition, the Code provides that, “[i]f the birth mother is a surviv-
ing spouse and at her deceased spouse’s death no divorce proceeding was 
pending, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary” it 
is presumed that the deceased spouse had the necessary intent.52  Taken to-
gether, these two provisions create a strong presumption in favor of finding 
a parent–child relationship between the posthumously conceived child and 
the deceased father in most cases. 
Compared to the written consent requirements set out in Vernoff, the 
Code has a more lenient standard on proving consent to father a child post-
humously.53  In addition to making paternity easier to establish, the Code 
(in most circumstances) would allow the child to inherit from his or her fa-
ther as the result of a legal fiction that the child was alive at the time of the 
father’s death.54  By treating the posthumously conceived child as “in ges-
tation” during the father’s life if the mother is pregnant with the child with-
in three years of the father’s death—or if the child is born within forty-five 
months after the father’s death—the Code would recognize no legal differ-
ence between posthumously and naturally-conceived children.55  The thir-
ty-six month period between the decedent’s death and conception “allow[s] 
a surviving spouse . . . a period of grieving, time to make up his or her 
 
 51. Id. § 2-120(f). 
 52. Id. § 2-120(h)(2). 
 53. Consent to father a posthumous child can now be established by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the deceased husband, by virtue of being married to the child’s mother, 
intended to father the child.  See id. § 2-120(f).  There is no requirement that there be a writ-
ten record.  See id. § 2-120(f)(2)(C). 
 54. Compare id. § 2-104(a)(2) (“An individual in gestation at a decedent’s death is 
deemed to be living at the decedent’s death if the individual lives 120 hours after birth.”), 
with id. § 2-120(k) (treating a posthumously conceived child as being “in gestation at the 
[father’s] death . . . if the child is: (1) in utero not later than 36 months after the individual’s 
death; or (2) born not later than 45 months after the individual’s death.”) 
 55. Section 2-120 of the Code has answered the question posed by many scholars over 
the survivorship requirement.  See, e.g., Kristine S. Knaplund, Postmortem Conception and 
a Father’s Last Will, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 115 (2004) (“[T]he requirement that heirs must 
survive the decedent is ‘indicative that they must be in existence at the time of the dece-
dent’s death.’”) (quoting Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961, 966 (D. Ariz. 
2002), rev’d, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
9
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mind about whether to go forward with assisted reproduction, and a rea-
sonable allowance for unsuccessful attempts to achieve a pregnancy.”56 
Although the Uniform Probate Code has not been adopted by every 
state, it provides a good foundation for addressing the inheritance rights of 
children conceived posthumously from PMSR.  The three-year time limit 
between the decedent’s death and the conception of the child provides an 
adequate time frame within which to conceive, while still allowing for a 
narrow, yet acceptable, construction of inheritance rights and Social Securi-
ty benefits to support the child.  The Uniform Probate Code, however, only 
addresses the rights of the posthumously conceived child after birth.  It fails 
to address the initial question of when a request for PMSR should be grant-
ed and the essential question of the deceased’s consent on posthumous con-
ception.  
III. HOW MUCH WEIGHT SHOULD THE LAW GIVE THE SELF-SERVING 
EVIDENCE OF A MAN’S POSTMORTEM INTENT?57 
Hecht was the easy case: the decedent had clearly expressed, through 
multiple written statements, his intent that his girlfriend should take posses-
sion of his stored sperm for the purpose of postmortem artificial insemina-
tion.58  Hecht’s analysis did not turn on the issue of consent, but on public 
policy, probate laws, and property laws.59  In using “the Hecht theory” as a 
foundation for developing law on PMSR, the key will be in upholding the 
suggestion that when “the issue is postmortem reproduction using gamete 
material from a deceased donor, the decedent’s intent as to such use should 
control.”60 
But what happens when there is not explicit consent through written 
letters or a will?  What happens when a man dies without mentioning any 
intent to conceive posthumously?  Or even more puzzling, can intent be 
implied when there is evidence a man wanted to have children with his 
wife but died before his wife became pregnant?61  If the presence of con-
 
 56. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k) cmt. (k); see also infra Part III.B (discussing the 
time periods involved with PMSR). 
 57. This section of the Comment addresses consent issues as they relate to granting or 
denying PMSR requests, rather than whether a child will inherit from the father or receive 
Social Security benefits. 
 58. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276–77, 279 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
 59. Id. at 280–83; see also supra notes 14–29 and accompanying text. 
 60. In re Estate of Kievernagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311, 316 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (discuss-
ing Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283). 
 61. See L. Cannold, Who Owns a Dead Man’s Sperm?: A Sad Outcome, But the Right 
One, 30 J. MED. ETHICS 386, 386 (2004), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/ 
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sent between a husband and a wife is debatable, how could consent ever be 
implied for an unmarried couple?62 
A.  The Problem of Consent 
The ambiguity of unwritten consent poses the biggest problem on the 
threshold of PMSR—granting the initial request to extract sperm from the 
husband.  Because the law has been mute on whether it is legal and ethical 
to extract sperm from a corpse,63 hospitals have had to depend upon their 
own guidelines in making that decision.64 
One particular sperm retrieval guideline from the New York Hospital 
provides that a deceased’s consent to postmortem sperm retrieval can be 
“reasonably inferred” in the absence of express consent.65  The guideline 
continues by stating “only men undergoing fertility treatment, actively at-
tempting conception or who had specifically expressed their plans to at-
tempt conception in the immediate future would be suitable candidates for 
retrieval.”66  Although these actions during a man’s life would create a rea-
sonable inference that he did in fact want to conceive a child with his 
spouse,67 can pre-mortem intent to raise a child with his wife really transfer 
 
articles/PMC1733912/pdf/v030p00386.pdf.  Cannold writes: 
[A] legitimate decision to grant a sperm seeker access to a dead man’s sperm 
needs to be grounded in a belief that the seeker’s access and use of the sperm 
would not contravene the dead man’s autonomy but—through doing what “he 
would have wanted”—extend it.  Such a decision would also need to be based on 
a clear conviction that in attempting to gain access to the dead man’s sperm, the 
seeker is not using the dead man as a means to their own ends, but both expressing 
her love for him and attempting, by enabling the birth of his genetic offspring, to 
pay tribute to him. 
Id. 
 62. Although Hecht involved an unmarried couple, the decedent had expressed—
continuously and explicitly—his intent to conceive posthumously with his girlfriend, and 
therefore, that case has no effect on the answer to this rhetorical question.  Hecht, 20 Cal. 
Rptr. at 276–77. 
 63. This particular issue (the propriety of extracting sperm postmortem) has never been 
litigated and there is no specific legislation on its legality.  See supra Part II.A–C. 
 64. See infra Part V (suggesting a solution for when hospitals grant or deny PMSR re-
quests based upon their own guidelines). 
 65. New York Hospital Guidelines, supra note 7; see also Katz, supra note 1, at 308 
(discussing New York Hospital Guidelines as it concerns consent and the right to request 
retrieval). 
 66. New York Hospital Guidelines, supra note 7. 
 67. In this day and age, these actions could be taken with a girlfriend or a same-sex 
partner with the intent to conceive a child; however, for the purposes of analyzing the con-
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to postmortem intent to have his wife conceive, bear, and raise his biologi-
cal child after he is dead?  While there may be an argument that intent can 
be implied in this situation, “it is significantly different for a man to intend 
to consent to [the] use of his sperm to create a child while he is alive . . . 
than to consent to hav[ing] his sperm extracted from his dead body . . . and 
later used to create a pregnancy.”68 
Due to the sensitive (and controversial) nature of PMSR, it is easier 
for people to accept PMSR when the decedent was married to the request-
ing party.69  Although this Comment assumes that marriage alone cannot 
establish intent to conceive and father a child posthumously, it is much eas-
ier to prove the requisite consent when the couple was married.70  By plac-
ing greater weight on the husband–wife relationship with regard to post-
humous conception, a presumption against PMSR surfaces when the couple 
is not married.71 
Other problems with interpreting consent arise due to the biased na-
ture of the evidence provided by the requesting party.  Sometimes the only 
evidence of the deceased husband’s intent is the wife’s interpretations of 
her husband’s actions and words.  Clearly, the wife requesting PMSR is not 
impartial.  As will be discussed in more detail in the following subpart, 
grief alone can cloud a woman’s judgment when requesting PMSR.72  If the 
wife is the one requesting PMSR, she may have the motive to lie about her 
husband’s intent in order to get what she wants: his sperm.  For these rea-
sons, the wife’s one-sided testimony about her husband’s intent regarding 
PMSR is unreliable.  Despite this unreliability, the wife is in the best posi-
tion to know what the husband wanted.73 
B.  The Time Crunch 
The absence of explicit donor consent, the intense grief experienced by sur-
viving partners who request the procedure in the hours following an un-
timely death, and the short timeframe for executing the request prior to de-
terioration of the reproductive material all intensify the ethical and legal 
 
sent guidelines hospitals have developed, this particular argument put forth will assume only 
the relationship of deceased husband and surviving wife. 
 68. See Cannold, supra note 61, at 386. 
 69. See infra Parts IV.A, IV.D. 
 70. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f) (amended 2008). 
 71. This is more of a public policy argument than established law, as it is clear couples 
are allowed to procreate without regard to marriage. 
 72. See infra Part IV.A–D. 
 73. See Corvalan, supra note 27, at 353 (discussing a court’s reliance on the wife as 
being the party “in the best position to determine [the deceased husband’s] intent.”). 
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questions that surround the more general practice of posthumous assisted 
reproduction.74 
Another unique problem facing hospitals in making the decision to 
grant or deny a request to extract sperm from a dead man’s corpse is the 
fleeting time period during which the sperm can be extracted, frozen, and 
remain viable.75  Usually, the procedure must occur within twenty-four 
hours after death.76  With the grief and pain a widow feels during these 
hours, it is natural to want the quick fix,77 but it is seemingly impossible to 
decipher the deceased’s true, “legal” intent regarding PMSR within the lim-
ited time frame for successful sperm extraction.78 
Experiencing the loss of a loved one can make it difficult for a griev-
ing widow to fully understand whether PMSR is what her deceased hus-
band truly wanted.79  Due to the limited time frame within which a doctor 
can successfully extract viable sperm, the widow’s statements that her de-
ceased husband would have wanted PMSR are both self-serving and cloud-
ed by grief.80  For that reason, some believe the widow cannot be trusted 
automatically.81 
Under their guidelines, hospitals have shown that they are capable of 
making the quick decision regarding whether consent exists.82  However, 
this consent determination has no relationship with the legal intent required 
for the child to inherit posthumously.  If the legislature were to take over 
and regulate the granting and denying of PMSR requests, the hospitals may 
not be equipped to make both a quick consent determination and the legal 
consent investigation.83  It is necessary, therefore, to strike a balance be-
 
 74. Jason D. Hans, Attitudes Toward Posthumous Harvesting And Reproduction, 32 
DEATH STUDIES 837, 838 (2008). 
 75. See id. at 841 (stating that the most successful procedures are done within twenty-
four hours after death); supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 76. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 77. See Cannold, supra note 61, at 386 (discussing how the loss of a loved one can cre-
ate a desire to continue his legacy and life through other forms, specifically PMSR). 
 78. This is assuming there is no written, explicit consent.  “Legal intent” is used here to 
refer to the consent that is required for the child to be eligible to receive under intestate suc-
cession. 
 79. See Cannold, supra note 61, at 386 (acknowledging that grief can lead one to ask 
for PMSR without being able to articulate—much less fully understand—that PMSR is what 
the deceased would have wanted). 
 80. Id. (stating that the widows are in their first stage of grief when making the request 
for PMSR). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See generally New York Hospital Guidelines, supra note 7. 
 83. See infra Part V. 
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tween regulating PMSR at the request stage and regulating the rights of the 
children conceived posthumously through PMSR. 
A compromise to the problem is to require the wife to meet a height-
ened consent requirement at a later stage when the wife intends to impreg-
nate herself with the extracted sperm.  The hospital, using its own guide-
lines, would continue to grant and deny PMSR requests, but in order for a 
widow to actually use and become impregnated with the decedent’s sperm, 
she would have to come forward with more compelling evidence of the de-
ceased’s intentions to conceive posthumously.  This second-layer require-
ment of intent would eliminate the problems associated with the twenty-
four hour limitation on sperm extraction, e.g., grief, poor judgment, and 
selfishness. 
IV. PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PMSR 
As with any controversial issue, there have been numerous public pol-
icy arguments against legitimatizing PMSR.  The first three subparts of 
Part III will address the public policy arguments against hospitals granting 
requests to perform PMSR procedures, as well as provide the opposing po-
sitions on those issues.  The remaining two subparts will address society’s 
sentiments on the issue and provide plausible reasons why women request 
for their deceased husband’s sperm to be extracted. 
A.  The Single-Parent Hypothesis 
One of the most-cited arguments against postmortem conception using 
PMSR is that a child born posthumously without a living father and raised 
by only one parent will be adversely affected.84  Kane’s children in Hecht 
used this very argument to persuade the court that giving the sperm to 
Hecht would violate public policy because of the harm a child conceived in 
that manner would suffer.85  The court refused to fully address those public 
policy arguments,86 and so the single-parent hypothesis continues as a 
 
 84. See, e.g., Sorin Hostiuc & Cristian George Curca, Informed Consent in Posthumous 
Sperm Procurement, 282 ARCHIVES OF GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 433, 436 (2010). 
 85. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 279 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).  Specifi-
cally, Kane’s children argued that a posthumously born child would never know his father 
and “never even have the slightest hope of being raised in a traditional family.”  Id.  They 
also contended that a posthumously born child would (1) “disrupt[_] existing families,” and 
(2) cause “emotional, psychological and financial stress on those family members already in 
existence.”  Id. 
 86. The Hecht court addressed other public policy arguments put forth by the Kane 
children, specifically whether it violated public policy for Hecht, as an unmarried woman, to 
become impregnated with the sperm.  Id. at 287 (holding that it did not violate public poli-
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strong argument against allowing PMSR to occur.  The gist of the single-
parent hypothesis is this: “Children who spend their entire childhood living 
with their married, biological parents experience, on average, fewer aca-
demic, behavioral and social problems during both childhood and adult-
hood than those who spend time in other family types.”87 
Many studies have been done to prove the harmful effects suffered by 
a child raised in a single-parent home.88  The studies have shown, however, 
that a child is more likely to suffer harmful effects of a single-parent home 
when the home is inadequately financed.89  One study showed that “[a] 
child of a single parent living in poverty is from 11% to 26% more likely to 
be behind in school than a child of the same sex and ethnicity who resides 
in a husband–wife family with income above the poverty level.”90 
Arguably, however, the adverse effects of growing up in a low-
income, single-parent home will be much less likely to occur with children 
born through postmortem sperm retrieval.91  The PMSR procedure alone is 
moderately expensive to perform.92  If these costs are correct, then low-
income mothers will likely be unable to pay for the procedure.  This alone, 
however, does not negate the monetary argument: 
First, on average, two-biological-parent families have higher household in-
comes and more assets than other family types.  Low incomes  constrain 
parents’ ability to purchase goods and services for their children, thus re-
ducing the quality of children’s home and out-of-home environments.  
Economic hardship may also increase parents’ psychological distress and 
 
cy).  In ruling on that public policy argument, the court failed to consider the other public 
policy arguments raised by the Kane children, specifically the harmful effects of bringing a 
child into the world posthumously.  See id. at 290–91 (stating that Kane’s children had 
failed to establish any legal or factual basis for their argument of adverse effects). 
 87. Katherine Magnuson & Lawrence M. Berger, Family Structure States and Transi-
tions: Associations with Children’s Wellbeing During Middle Childhood, 71 J. MARRIAGE & 
FAM. 575, 575 (2009). 
 88. See, e.g., id. 
 89. See, e.g., id. 
 90. Doris R. Entwisle & Karl L. Alexander, Family Type and Children’s Growth in 
Reading and Math Over the Primary Grades, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 341, 342 (1996), 
available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 353500?origin=crossref&. 
 91. See Lynne A. Hall et al., Psychosocial Predictors of Maternal Depressive Symp-
toms, Parenting Attitudes, and Child Behavior in Single-Parent Families, 40 NURSING 
RESEARCH 214, 218 (1991), available at 
http://journals.lww.com/nursingresearchonline/Abstract/ 
1991/07000/Psychosocial_Predictors_of_Maternal_Depressive.6.aspx. 
 92. See Katz, supra note 1, at 311 (stating that PMSR would cost “several thousand dol-
lars”). 
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reduce sensitive caregiving.  As a result, low family incomes may adverse-
ly influence children’s cognitive development and behavior.93 
Other factors may place strain on a child of a single-parent home.  So-
cial and psychological problems may result from the decreased amount of 
attention a single parent is able to provide.94  Single parents must juggle 
more responsibility than their counterparts in husband–wife families.95  
Additionally, single parents struggle to break away from and overcome so-
ciety’s expectations of parenting.96  These additional burdens have the po-
tential to adversely affect the child due to less effective parenting.97 
Despite this evidence, many children in single-parent homes have 
thrived from the increased stress and abnormal family dynamic.98  Fur-
thermore, the struggle may actually help a child’s social development.99  
Although the single-parent hypothesis has been around for many years, it 
does not appear to have much truth value in today’s society.100  Single par-
enting has become a norm in today’s times.  In fact, nearly half of all chil-
dren under the age of eighteen will spend time in a single-parent home.101  
At this rate, the single-parent hypothesis may become moot. 
B.  The Marriage Restriction102 
Another argument put forth by opponents of PMSR is that PMSR 
should be granted only if the woman requesting the sperm extraction was 
married to the deceased donor at the time of his death.  This is a much 
stronger argument than the single-parent hypothesis because it goes straight 
to a critical issue: consent.  The Uniform Probate Code provides a pre-
sumption in favor of consent when the decedent and the woman requesting 
his sperm were married at the time of the decedent’s death with no divorce 
proceedings pending.103 
 
 93. Magnuson & Berger, supra note 87, at 576 (citations omitted). 
 94. See id. at 575 (discussing the decreased parental time, attention, supervision, and 
monitoring that children of single-parent homes receive as compared to children of two-
biological-parent homes). 
 95. Id. at 576. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 577. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Katz, supra note 1, at 313–14 (discussing single parenthood and questioning 
whether there is any weight to the argument against single parenting). 
 101. Magnuson & Berger, supra note 87, at 575. 
 102. See infra Part IV.D. 
 103. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(h) (amended 2008). 
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Despite this presumption in favor of marriage, it can hardly be argued 
that unmarried couples cannot procreate.  One scholar, however, went so 
far as to state, “the non-married person has no legal right to the decedent’s 
sperm.  Everyone agrees to that.”104  This statement, however, carries no 
weight in light of Hecht, where the court held it was not against public pol-
icy for an unmarried woman to impregnate herself with the decedent’s 
sperm.105  If it were not against public policy for an unmarried woman to 
impregnate herself with a deceased’s sperm, would it be violative of public 
policy if PMSR requests were only granted to the wife of the deceased? 
C.  The Sanctity of the Dead 
Our society has a lot of respect for the sanctity of a dead body.106  
While some oppose PMSR because it allows posthumously conceived chil-
dren to be born to single mothers,107 others suggest that PMSR “repre-
sent[s] a mutilation of the dead” attributable to a “lack of respect.”108  This 
is especially true when the requesting party is seeking the sperm without 
having a solid conviction that she will in fact use it to conceive a child.109  
As previously suggested, early stages of mourning can cloud a widow’s 
judgment about whether her husband would have truly wanted his sperm 
extracted so that she could conceive a child.110 
In moments of unbelievable grief, the widow may think that PMSR is 
a great idea because she may be able to conceive a child with her deceased 
husband several years down the road.  She may later decide not to conceive 
a child with her deceased husband’s sperm.  If the widow decides not to use 
the sperm to conceive a child, her dead husband’s corpse would have been 
violated for no other reason than to give her reproductive peace of mind for 
a couple of years.  That is when society must ask: was it worth it to invade 
the deceased’s body? 
 
 104. Norman Bauman, Law Provides Little Guidance for Postmortem Sperm Retrieval, 
UROLOGY TIMES, Oct. 1998, at 21, 22. 
 105. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 287 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); see also 
supra Part II.A. 
 106. See Cannold, supra note 61, at 386. 
 107. See supra Part IV.A. 
 108. Katz, supra note 1, at 296 (quoting New York Hospital Guidelines) 
 109. See id. at 311–12.  In the alternative, a woman might decide to have numerous chil-
dren using the deceased’s sperm, to the point that it exceeds his consent to conceive post-
humously.  Arguably, this violates the dead by encroaching on his reproductive autonomy. 
 110. See supra Part III.B. 
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Although this Comment suggests that hospitals should engage in a 
two-part consent inquiry,111 this Comment does not propose that PMSR 
should be granted with such leniency that it becomes standard protocol for 
every autopsy.  The initial request for extraction should only be granted 
when the wife has shown her sincere intention to use the sperm to conceive 
at a later point in time.  While this does not resolve the debate over whether 
PMSR is a mutilation of a corpse,112 it does limit the number of pointless 
bodily invasions that might otherwise occur. 
D.  A Study of Society’s Sentiments 
In 2008, a quantitative study was conducted to test society’s senti-
ments on PMSR.113  Jason Hans interviewed over 400 people, ages eight-
een to eighty-eight.114  The survey asked whether hospitals should grant a 
request for PMSR under various circumstances.115  The variables that 
changed included: the marital status of the couple; the length of the cou-
ple’s relationship; the gender of the survivor; whether the deceased died 
unexpectedly; the parental status of the couple; whether the couple had 
plans for childbearing; the intentions of the deceased and whether he had 
expressed his intentions; and lastly, whether the deceased’s parents were 
supportive of the idea.116 
The results of the study show overwhelmingly that the marital status 
of the couple played a significant role in the interviewee’s response.117  
When the couple was married, the interviewee was twice as likely to sup-
port PMSR than if the couple only lived together.118  Whether the couple 
had discussed PMSR also played a role in the interviewee’s decision on 
whether PMSR should be permitted.119 
In cases where PMSR had never been discussed by the deceased 
spouse but the couple was married and the deceased’s parents were sup-
portive, 61.8 percent of the interviewees said PMSR should be allowed.120  
 
 111. See supra Part III.B. 
 112. See Hostiuc & Curca, supra note 84, at 434–35 (analogizing the rape of a woman to 
the breach of a man’s reproductive autonomy when he becomes a father after his death and 
without his consent). 
 113. Hans, supra note 74, at 843. 
 114. Id. at 844. 
 115. Id. at 845–49. 
 116. Id. at 846–49. 
 117. Id. at 855; see supra Part IV.B. 
 118. Hans, supra note 74, at 852. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 856. 
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By contrast, in cases where PMSR had not been discussed, the couple was 
unmarried, and the parents were unsupportive, only 17.2 percent of the in-
terviewees favored PMSR.121  Even in cases where the deceased left written 
directions indicating his intent that a PMSR be performed, the approval rate 
of PMSR dropped more than ten percent if the couple was unmarried and 
the parents did not approve.122  Based on this evidence, it appears that soci-
ety places greater emphasis on the marital status of the couple and the de-
ceased’s parents’ feelings on the issue of PMSR than it does on the de-
ceased’s express wishes. 
E.  Additional Reasons in Support of PMSR 
There are endless reasons why a woman might use PMSR to conceive 
a child.  For example, a woman may believe that using her deceased hus-
band’s sperm would be a way to pay tribute to him.123  A woman may be-
lieve that conceiving posthumously may help her cope with the loss of her 
husband because he would live on through the child.  In addition, a woman 
who wanted to bear a child might have religious reasons for wanting to use 
only her husband’s sperm.124  In particular, the woman might view artificial 
insemination using donor sperm as “an adulterous act.”125  Another im-
portant reason for choosing PMSR is that a woman might “desire to know 
the genetic origins of [her] child.”126  Using her husband’s sperm, the 
woman will presumably know much more about the child’s family and ge-
netic history than she would if she used donor sperm or adopted a child.127  
The posthumously conceived child would have a “genetic connection” with 
his father’s family and would have a secure place within the family tree.128  
Due to this genetic connection, the child may have more peace of mind in 
knowing that he or she was conceived from a loving relationship rather 
than from an unknown sperm donor. 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. (finding an 83.3 percent approval rate for a married couple with parental support 
and a 73.1 percent approval rate for an unmarried couple without parental support). 
 123. See Knaplund, supra note 55, at 398. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. (stating that the “Eastern Orthodox Church ‘opposes gamete donation, especially 
AID [Artificial Insemination by Donor], on the basis that it is an adulterous act.’”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 398–99. 
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V. WHO SHOULD HAVE THE FINAL WORD AND WHAT SHOULD THAT 
FINAL WORD BE? 
There is a clear need for states to address the issues surrounding the 
harvesting of sperm from a dead man’s body and the status of children con-
ceived and born posthumously through PMSR.  But the real question is: 
who should have the responsibility of regulating PMSR and clarifying the 
status of the children born through PMSR?  Should it be left to the medical 
community?  Should it be left to the courts to blindly decide on a case-by-
case basis?129  Should it be left to the elected legislature?  Should lawyers 
be responsible for asking the right questions of their clients when drafting 
wills?130 
This Comment recommends that an analogue to the Statute of Wills be 
created for PMSR.  The proposed statute would have two purposes: (1) to 
establish rules for requesting the sperm extraction and (2) to clarify the le-
gal rights of children conceived and born posthumously through PMSR.131  
Creating this Statute of Formalities for PMSR will solve many of the legal 
and ethical problems that currently arise after the death of the donor.  If the 
formalities are met, a PMSR could be conducted and a posthumously con-
ceived child would legally be treated as a legitimate child of the deceased 
donor. 
There may be problems, however, with this proposal.  For example, 
can the legislature limit the PMSR right to the wife of the decedent?  Many 
scholars have suggested that the deceased’s wishes to procreate in a partic-
ular manner “should be honored in the same way that testamentary provi-
sions receive deference.”132  Therefore, if the decedent left clear instruc-
tions that he wanted his sperm extracted to conceive a child with a 
particular woman, those instructions should be respected, regardless of 
whether the woman is his wife.133  Another potential problem is whether 
the legislature may limit the woman’s right to reproduce by denying her ac-
 
 129. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 787 (Cal. 1993) (“It is not the role of the ju-
diciary to inhibit the use of reproductive technology when the Legislature has not seen fit to 
do so; any such effort would raise serious questions in light of the fundamental nature of the 
rights of procreation and privacy.”). 
 130. This is a good practice for lawyers, but it alone does not solve the problems sur-
rounding PMSR and posthumously conceived children. 
 131. For purposes of this Comment, the statute will be referred to as Statute of Formali-
ties of PMSR. which would include written consent (or its equivalent, proven by clear and 
convincing evidence) that the decedent intended to father a child posthumously through 
PMSR. 
 132. Katz, supra note 1, at 312. 
 133. If the instructions violate public policy, however, then the instructions might be dis-
regarded in the same manner that a will provision would be disregarded. 
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cess to the decedent’s sperm.  However, as suggested earlier in this Com-
ment,134 silence on the part of the deceased should not be construed as con-
sent.  Accordingly, it seems that the reproductive autonomy of the woman 
seeking PMSR can be limited to the extent that it would infringe upon the 
decedent’s reproductive autonomy.135 
Although the medical community has done well in setting guidelines 
for the difficult decision presented when a PMSR request is received, the 
only entities protected by the medical guidelines are the medical institu-
tions.  The guidelines ignore the interests of other parties involved in the 
PMSR,136 not because of a failure to consider the matter, but because it is 
not the hospitals’ responsibility to develop the law of PMSR.  For these 
reasons, this Comment suggests the two-layered consent requirement: one 
at the initial PMSR request stage, and the second when the wife attempts to 
conceive with the extracted sperm.137 
First, hospitals should continue to set their own guidelines for the ini-
tial request to perform PMSR, but should be required by law to provide no-
tice and obtain informed consent from the woman requesting PMSR.138  
Continuing to allow hospitals to set their own guidelines for granting and 
denying requests for PMSR allows the hospitals to avoid the responsibility 
(and potential legal liability) of deciphering the deceased husband’s true 
intent regarding the use of his sperm after his death.  Hospitals may not be 
as equipped as the legal community in making these legal determinations, 
especially in light of the typical twenty-four hour timeframe involved.139  
The required notice would inform the requesting woman that the child con-
ceived from PMSR might not be legally entitled to inherit or receive any 
benefits from the deceased father.  Furthermore, the notice would inform 
the woman that satisfying the hospital’s guidelines for consent should not 
be interpreted as meeting the Statute of Formalities, which would still be 
 
 134. See supra Parts II.B, III.A. 
 135. Due to the special nature of procreation, reproductive autonomy survives death.  See 
Katz, supra note 1, at 311 (“The dead are not usually thought of as having rights that sur-
vive death, but . . . procreative rights are exceptional.”). 
 136. See Bauman, supra note104, at 21, 22. 
 137. See id. 
 138. This allows PMSR requests to be granted based upon the consent required as set 
forth in that particular hospital’s guidelines, which presumably allows less strenuous evi-
dence of consent to enable the hospital to perform the extraction.  It further allows women 
to think twice about conceiving a child with the extracted sperm if they are aware their post-
humously conceived child may not inherit from the father without the required consent as 
set forth by the Statute of Formalities for PMSR.  This also helps alleviate the hospital’s 
need to meet the time crunch as described supra Part III.B. 
 139. See supra Part III.A–B. 
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required for her posthumously conceived child to legally inherit or receive 
benefits from the father. 
After the first layer of consent is established—meeting the hospital’s 
“reasonably inferred” consent requirement for initial extraction140 and the 
notice requirements—the Statute of Formalities would then place the bur-
den on the wife to establish her deceased husband’s intent to conceive and 
father a child posthumously.  The second layer of the Statute of Formalities 
would be triggered after the PMSR, only if the wife attempted to use the 
extracted sperm for conception.  In order to impregnate herself with the ex-
tracted sperm, the wife would need to either (1) meet the Statute of Formal-
ities, ensuring that her child would be legally recognized as a child of the 
deceased, or (2) sign a waiver acknowledging that she abandons her right to 
challenge her child’s inability to receive benefits by virtue of his or her bio-
logical father. 
Like the Statute of Wills,141 the Statute of Formalities would have 
three formal requirements.  First, the Statute of Formalities would require a 
written document that unequivocally demonstrates the deceased’s intent 
that (1) his sperm be extracted postmortem for his wife’s use,142 (2) the ex-
tracted sperm be used to conceive his child posthumously, and (3) he sup-
port the posthumously conceived child.143  Merely stating that the wife is 
entitled to use the deceased’s sperm will not suffice.  Secondly, the docu-
ment would need to contain the deceased’s signature.  Lastly, the de-
ceased’s signing of the document would need to be witnessed by two disin-
terested persons.  Practically speaking, anyone other than the wife or other 
PMSR recipient could qualify as a disinterested witness. 
When the deceased’s intent is unclear or unascertainable, the Statute 
of Formalities would not be met, and therefore, any child born from PMSR 
will not receive any benefits from his deceased biological father.144  How-
 
 140. See supra Part III.B; supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
 141. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.3 (2009) (mandating that a decedent’s will be in 
writing, signed by the testator, and witnessed by at least two competent persons.) 
 142. While the Uniform Probate Code places a presumption in favor of finding the requi-
site intent for posthumous conception when the couple is married, it is not necessary that the 
couple be married if the elements of the Statute of Formalities are met.  See supra notes 53–
55 and accompanying text; supra Part II.A (discussing the relationship status in Hecht). 
 143. See supra Part II.A.  In Hecht, Kane’s intent for his girlfriend to have and use his 
stored sperm to conceive a child after his death was clear.  Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 275, 276–77 (Cal Ct. App 1993).  This would easily satisfy the intent prong of the 
Statute of Formalities. 
 144. But see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f)(2)(C) (requiring clear and convincing evi-
dence of intent to parent a posthumously conceived child, but not mandating that it be in 
writing); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(h)(2) (providing a presumption, in the absence of 
clear and convincing evidence, of when the couple was married). 
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ever, assuming the wife could meet the hospital’s reasonably inferred con-
sent requirement, the Statute of Formalities would not prevent the wife 
from extracting the deceased’s sperm, nor would it prevent her from actual-
ly conceiving a child with the extracted sperm.  This alternative balances 
the wife’s freedom to conceive against the state’s interest in protecting pro-
bate and Social Security laws.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
With each passing year, medical and reproductive technologies may 
advance far beyond our wildest dreams.145  There is no doubt that PMSR 
will one day seem ancient and out of date in the medical and legal commu-
nities.  As PMSR fades from the headlines, a new controversial procedure 
will be on the horizon to take its place.  As medical reproductive technolo-
gy continues to advance, so too should our legal standards and regulations.  
It is inevitable that medicine will always be a step ahead of the law, but the 
least the legal community can do is attempt to keep up with modern ad-
vances in technology.146 
It is not enough to adopt the mindset of the trial judge in Hecht who 
stated, “we are forging new frontiers because science has run ahead of 
common law[,] [a]nd we have got to have some sort of appellate decision 
telling us what rights are in these uncharted territories.”147  It is not up to 
the courts to blindly shape the law of PMSR.  Well-drafted legislation 
needs to be established to protect the posthumously born child, the dece-
dent’s estate, and all other individuals involved.  Without meeting the Stat-
ute of Formalities for PMSR, a child would not be able to inherit from his 
or her genetic father in the same way a child conceived from an anonymous 
sperm donor cannot inherit from the donor.148  While it is possible to leave 
the decision of granting or denying PMSR requests to the hospital, a Statute 
of Formalities for PMSR should be developed to aid hospitals in making 
such decisions and to resolve the uncertain legal status of posthumously 
conceived children. 
 
 145. See Knaplund, supra note 55, at 397 (suggesting that women’s eggs and ovaries 
will soon be eligible for PMSR); Michael K. Elliott, Tales of Parenthood From the Crypt: 
The Predicament of the Posthumously Conceived Child, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 47, 
68 (2004) (“As reproductive technology and biotechnology develop, science fiction can turn 
into reality . . . .  ‘As quickly as courts [can] deal with one [new] issue of new reproductive 
technology, a new technology is developed that creates even more complicated issues.’”). 
 146. See Knaplund, supra note 55, at 414–15. 
 147. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 280 n.3. 
 148. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(b). 
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